Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199695331
- eISBN:
- 9780191758218
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for ...
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The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for philosophical theories, whether that evidence is a priori, and whether the results of experimental philosophy affect the evidential or a priori status of intuitions. The second is whether there are explanations of the a priori and what range of propositions can be justified and known a priori. The third is whether a priori justified beliefs are needed in order to avoid some skeptical worries. The fourth is whether certain recent challenges to the existence or significance of the a priori are successful.Less
The chapters in this volume aim to advance the discussion of the role of the a priori in philosophy by addressing four sets of issues. The first is whether intuitions provide evidence for philosophical theories, whether that evidence is a priori, and whether the results of experimental philosophy affect the evidential or a priori status of intuitions. The second is whether there are explanations of the a priori and what range of propositions can be justified and known a priori. The third is whether a priori justified beliefs are needed in order to avoid some skeptical worries. The fourth is whether certain recent challenges to the existence or significance of the a priori are successful.
Laurie Shrage
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153095
- eISBN:
- 9780199870615
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515309X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As ...
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This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.Less
This book argues that Roe v. Wade's six‐month time span for abortion “on demand” polarized the American public, and obscured alternatives that could have gained broad public support. As a result, a predictable bureaucratic backlash to legal abortion has ensued that has placed legal abortion services out of reach for women who are poor, young, or live far from urban centers. Explores the origins of Roe's regulatory scheme and demonstrates that it resulted from concerns that have considerably less relevance in today's medical context. Endorses regulatory guidelines, first proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, which would give states more flexibility in setting the time span for unrestricted abortion. Argues that the standard civil liberty defenses of abortion (i.e. privacy, involuntary servitude, self‐defense, religious freedom) offer better support for these guidelines than for Roe’s scheme, and that a time span for nontherapeutic abortions shorter than six months can both protect women's interests and advance important public interests. The book also critiques the individualism of “pro‐choice” post‐Roe abortion rights campaigns for failing to articulate how women's reproductive options depend on access to public services and resources and not only on being let alone. Urges reproductive rights activists to emphasize the interconnections both between social responsibility and respect for human life, and between the Samaritan obligations of pregnant women and those of other citizens. Explores feminist artwork on abortion to extrapolate tools for refocusing the abortion debate on these issues and for contesting the extremist tactics of the “pro‐life” movement.
Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198713265
- eISBN:
- 9780191781711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything ...
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This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.Less
This volume addresses foundational issues concerning the nature of first-personal, or de se thought and how such thoughts are communicated. One of the question addressed is whether there is anything distinctive about de se thought or whether it can be subsumed under broader phenomena. Many have held that de se thought motivates a revision to traditional accounts of content or positing special ways of accessing such contents. Gottlob Frege famously held that first-person thoughts involve a subject being “presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.” However, as Frege also noted, this raises many puzzling questions when we consider how we are able to communicate such thoughts. Is there indeed something special about first-person thought such that it requires a primitive mode of presentation that cannot be grasped by others? If there really is something special about first-person thought, what happens when I communicate this thought to you? Do you come to believe the very thing that I believe? Or is my first-person belief only entertained by me? If it is only entertained by me, how does it relate to what you come to believe? It is these questions that the volume addresses and seeks to answer.
Emily Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198807933
- eISBN:
- 9780191845727
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198807933.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
What is time? Traditionally, it has been answered that time is a product of the human mind, or the motion of celestial bodies. In the mid-seventeenth century, a new kind of answer emerged: time or ...
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What is time? Traditionally, it has been answered that time is a product of the human mind, or the motion of celestial bodies. In the mid-seventeenth century, a new kind of answer emerged: time or eternal duration is ‘absolute’, in the sense it is independent of human minds and material bodies. This study explores the development of absolute time or eternal duration during one of Britain’s richest and most creative metaphysical periods, from the 1640s to the 1730s. It features an interconnected set of main characters—Henry More, Walter Charleton, Isaac Barrow, Isaac Newton, John Locke, Samuel Clarke, and John Jackson—alongside a large and varied supporting cast, whose metaphysics are all read in their historical context and given a place in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century development of thought on time. In addition to interpreting the metaphysics of these characters, this study advances two general, developmental theses. First, the complexity of positions on time (and space) defended in early modern thought is hugely under-appreciated. Second, distinct kinds of absolutism emerged in British philosophy, helping us to understand why some absolutists considered time to be barely real, whilst others identified it with the most real being of all: God.Less
What is time? Traditionally, it has been answered that time is a product of the human mind, or the motion of celestial bodies. In the mid-seventeenth century, a new kind of answer emerged: time or eternal duration is ‘absolute’, in the sense it is independent of human minds and material bodies. This study explores the development of absolute time or eternal duration during one of Britain’s richest and most creative metaphysical periods, from the 1640s to the 1730s. It features an interconnected set of main characters—Henry More, Walter Charleton, Isaac Barrow, Isaac Newton, John Locke, Samuel Clarke, and John Jackson—alongside a large and varied supporting cast, whose metaphysics are all read in their historical context and given a place in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century development of thought on time. In addition to interpreting the metaphysics of these characters, this study advances two general, developmental theses. First, the complexity of positions on time (and space) defended in early modern thought is hugely under-appreciated. Second, distinct kinds of absolutism emerged in British philosophy, helping us to understand why some absolutists considered time to be barely real, whilst others identified it with the most real being of all: God.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199608744
- eISBN:
- 9780191747700
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view ...
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Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.Less
Abstract objects such as properties, propositions, numbers, degrees, and expression types are at the centre of many philosophical debates. Philosophers and linguists alike generally hold the view that natural language allows rather generously for reference to abstracts objects of the various sorts. The project of this book is to investigate in a fully systematic way whether and how natural language permits reference to abstract objects. For that purpose, the book will introduce a great range of new linguistic generalizations and make systematic use of recent semantic and syntactic theories. It will arrive at an ontology that differs rather radically from the one that philosophers, but also linguists, generally take natural language to involve. Reference to abstract objects is much more marginal than is generally thought. Instead of making reference to abstract objects, natural language, with its more central terms and constructions, makes reference to (concrete) particulars, especially tropes, as well as pluralities of particulars. Reference to abstract objects is generally reserved for syntactically complex and less central terms of the sort the property of being wise or the number eight.
Paolo Mancosu
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198746829
- eISBN:
- 9780191809095
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746829.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, History of Philosophy
The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that ...
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The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that related to the use of abstraction principles in neo-logicism. The most familiar abstraction principle in this context is Hume’s Principle. Hume’s Principle says that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one–one correspondence. Chapter 1 shows that abstraction principles were quite widespread in the mathematical practice that preceded Frege’s discussion of them. The second chapter provides the first contextual analysis of Frege’s discussion of abstraction principles in section 64 of the Grundlagen; the second part investigates the foundational reflection on abstraction principles in the Peanosets not by using school and Russell. Chapter 3 discusses a novel approach to measuring the size of infinite sets known as the theory of numerosities. This theory assigns numerosities to infinite sets not by using one–one correspondence but by preserving the part–whole principle, namely the principle according to which if a set A is strictly included in a set B, then the numerosity of A is strictly smaller than the numerosity of B. Mancosu shows how this new development leads to deep mathematical, historical, and philosophical problems. Chapter 4 brings the previous strands together by offering some surprising novel perspectives on neo-logicism.Less
The book provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. The notion of abstraction in question is that related to the use of abstraction principles in neo-logicism. The most familiar abstraction principle in this context is Hume’s Principle. Hume’s Principle says that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one–one correspondence. Chapter 1 shows that abstraction principles were quite widespread in the mathematical practice that preceded Frege’s discussion of them. The second chapter provides the first contextual analysis of Frege’s discussion of abstraction principles in section 64 of the Grundlagen; the second part investigates the foundational reflection on abstraction principles in the Peanosets not by using school and Russell. Chapter 3 discusses a novel approach to measuring the size of infinite sets known as the theory of numerosities. This theory assigns numerosities to infinite sets not by using one–one correspondence but by preserving the part–whole principle, namely the principle according to which if a set A is strictly included in a set B, then the numerosity of A is strictly smaller than the numerosity of B. Mancosu shows how this new development leads to deep mathematical, historical, and philosophical problems. Chapter 4 brings the previous strands together by offering some surprising novel perspectives on neo-logicism.
Philip A Ebert and Marcus Rossberg (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199645268
- eISBN:
- 9780191755330
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a ...
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The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a development of Frege’s original Logicism. The collection is structured as follows: After an extensive editors’ introduction to the topic of abstractionism, part II contains five contributions that deal with semantics and metaontology of Abstractionism, as well as the so-called Caesar Problem. Part III collects four contributions that discuss abstractionist epistemology, focusing on the idea of implicit definitions and non-evidential warrants (entitlements) to account for a priori mathematical knowledge. Four papers in part IV concern the mathematics of Abstractionism, in particular the issue of impredicativity, the Bad Company objection, and the question of abstractionist set theory. The last section contains three contributions that discuss Frege’s application constraint within an abstractionist setting.Less
The collection contains an extensive introduction and 16 original papers on the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Abstractionism—a position in the philosophy of mathematics which is a development of Frege’s original Logicism. The collection is structured as follows: After an extensive editors’ introduction to the topic of abstractionism, part II contains five contributions that deal with semantics and metaontology of Abstractionism, as well as the so-called Caesar Problem. Part III collects four contributions that discuss abstractionist epistemology, focusing on the idea of implicit definitions and non-evidential warrants (entitlements) to account for a priori mathematical knowledge. Four papers in part IV concern the mathematics of Abstractionism, in particular the issue of impredicativity, the Bad Company objection, and the question of abstractionist set theory. The last section contains three contributions that discuss Frege’s application constraint within an abstractionist setting.
Jennifer Lackey (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198791508
- eISBN:
- 9780191868450
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198791508.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Academic freedom, which allows members of institutions of higher learning to engage in intellectual pursuits without fear of censorship or retaliation, lies at the heart of the mission of the ...
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Academic freedom, which allows members of institutions of higher learning to engage in intellectual pursuits without fear of censorship or retaliation, lies at the heart of the mission of the university. Recent years have seen growing concerns about threats to academic freedom, many brought about from the changing norms of, and demands on, the university. A number of new issues—including content warnings, safe spaces, social media controversies, microaggressions, and no platforming—have given rise to loud cries, in both scholarly and popular contexts, that academic freedom is under serious attack. Despite this, there is surprisingly little philosophical work on the topic of academic freedom, and even less that directly takes up some of these new challenges. The present volume fills both of these gaps in the current literature by bringing together leading philosophers from a wide range of areas of expertise to weigh in on both traditional and timely issues involving academic freedom. The volume includes an introduction and ten previously unpublished essays, divided into four main sections: The Rationale for Academic Freedom, on the fundamental values that undergird the case for academic freedom; The Parameters of Academic Freedom, on when and where academic freedom applies; Silencing and Beyond: Microaggressions, Content Warnings, and Political Correctness, on some of the new challenges to academic freedom grounded in sensitivity to the political and emotional needs of an increasingly diverse academy; and Protests, Civil Disobedience, and No Platforming, on conflicts between academic freedom and the enforcement of laws and regulations governing the functioning of the university.Less
Academic freedom, which allows members of institutions of higher learning to engage in intellectual pursuits without fear of censorship or retaliation, lies at the heart of the mission of the university. Recent years have seen growing concerns about threats to academic freedom, many brought about from the changing norms of, and demands on, the university. A number of new issues—including content warnings, safe spaces, social media controversies, microaggressions, and no platforming—have given rise to loud cries, in both scholarly and popular contexts, that academic freedom is under serious attack. Despite this, there is surprisingly little philosophical work on the topic of academic freedom, and even less that directly takes up some of these new challenges. The present volume fills both of these gaps in the current literature by bringing together leading philosophers from a wide range of areas of expertise to weigh in on both traditional and timely issues involving academic freedom. The volume includes an introduction and ten previously unpublished essays, divided into four main sections: The Rationale for Academic Freedom, on the fundamental values that undergird the case for academic freedom; The Parameters of Academic Freedom, on when and where academic freedom applies; Silencing and Beyond: Microaggressions, Content Warnings, and Political Correctness, on some of the new challenges to academic freedom grounded in sensitivity to the political and emotional needs of an increasingly diverse academy; and Protests, Civil Disobedience, and No Platforming, on conflicts between academic freedom and the enforcement of laws and regulations governing the functioning of the university.
Jay F. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199275816
- eISBN:
- 9780191699849
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275816.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from ...
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This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from whom we still have much to learn, intelligently and creatively responding to significant questions that transcend his work's historical setting. The book's main project is to command a clear view of how Kant understands various perennial problems, how he attempts to resolve them, and to what extent he succeeds. The constructive portions of the First Critique—the Aesthetic and Analytic—are explored in detail; the Paralogisms and Antinomies more briefly. At the same time the book is an introduction to the challenges of reading the text of Kant's work and, to that end, selectively adopts a more rigorous historical and exegetical stance.Less
This book introduces Immanuel Kant's masterwork, the Critique of Pure Reason, from a ‘relaxed’ problem-oriented perspective which treats Kant as an especially insightful practising philosopher, from whom we still have much to learn, intelligently and creatively responding to significant questions that transcend his work's historical setting. The book's main project is to command a clear view of how Kant understands various perennial problems, how he attempts to resolve them, and to what extent he succeeds. The constructive portions of the First Critique—the Aesthetic and Analytic—are explored in detail; the Paralogisms and Antinomies more briefly. At the same time the book is an introduction to the challenges of reading the text of Kant's work and, to that end, selectively adopts a more rigorous historical and exegetical stance.
Susan C. C. Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199977383
- eISBN:
- 9780199369928
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199977383.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and ...
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This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and attitudes is not fully unified. But, overall, the book argues, current approaches to research and care accidentally reinforce intolerance of ADHD-diagnosed people, and simultaneously slow down growth in knowledge. To avoid these outcomes, the wide range of people involved with ADHD—including clinicians, scientists, educators, parents, policy-makers, and diagnosed individuals—need to jointly re-examine and change the attitudes, concepts, and practices typically taken toward ADHD. The book demonstrates how we derived our current medical, scientific, and social concepts of ADHD, shows why the concepts we now use are optional, and explains that we need change for both ethical and epistemic reasons. Ethically, we need new approaches because our current concepts and practices, which center on DSM-defined ADHD, dichotomization of “ADHD” from “non-ADHD,” and intervening on individuals rather than society, embed values that reflect and reinforce intolerance. Epistemically, opposition to alternatives has created a relative stasis in our understanding of ADHD. The book argues that any change will need to recognize the centrality of both facts and values to improved scientific, medical, and social approaches to ADHD. Shared goals of increasing knowledge, providing new options for diagnosed people, and decreasing stigmatization will drive the much-needed change; adopting inclusive, responsive decision making in all areas of practice will foster it.Less
This book examines both standard practice and ongoing controversies in social, medical, scientific, ethical, and philosophical approaches to ADHD. The complex web of concepts, data, needs, and attitudes is not fully unified. But, overall, the book argues, current approaches to research and care accidentally reinforce intolerance of ADHD-diagnosed people, and simultaneously slow down growth in knowledge. To avoid these outcomes, the wide range of people involved with ADHD—including clinicians, scientists, educators, parents, policy-makers, and diagnosed individuals—need to jointly re-examine and change the attitudes, concepts, and practices typically taken toward ADHD. The book demonstrates how we derived our current medical, scientific, and social concepts of ADHD, shows why the concepts we now use are optional, and explains that we need change for both ethical and epistemic reasons. Ethically, we need new approaches because our current concepts and practices, which center on DSM-defined ADHD, dichotomization of “ADHD” from “non-ADHD,” and intervening on individuals rather than society, embed values that reflect and reinforce intolerance. Epistemically, opposition to alternatives has created a relative stasis in our understanding of ADHD. The book argues that any change will need to recognize the centrality of both facts and values to improved scientific, medical, and social approaches to ADHD. Shared goals of increasing knowledge, providing new options for diagnosed people, and decreasing stigmatization will drive the much-needed change; adopting inclusive, responsive decision making in all areas of practice will foster it.
Richard Pettigrew
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732716
- eISBN:
- 9780191797019
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian ...
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This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.Less
This book explores a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that the book justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are met along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, credences should be distributed equally over all possibilities that are entertained; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how responses are planned when new evidence is received. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, the book looks to decision theory. An agent’s credences are treated as if they were a choice she makes. The book appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility given is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology.
Gwen Bradford
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198714026
- eISBN:
- 9780191782473
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But ...
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Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But of course not just any process and product together makes an achievement. The process of an achievement is difficult, and it culminates in the product in a way that is competent. These two elements—difficulty and competent causation—are the two essential features of achievements, and are also sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a perfectionist theory, according to which the exercise of our characteristically human capacities has intrinsic value. But not just any perfectionist account will do. Perfectionism must acknowledge that the will is among the characteristic capacities. This book investigates the nature and value of achievements, and proposes a new strand of perfectionism to account for their value.Less
Achievement is a central element in the best human lives. But just what is achievement? And why is achievement valuable? Achievements have a common structure: a process culminates in a product. But of course not just any process and product together makes an achievement. The process of an achievement is difficult, and it culminates in the product in a way that is competent. These two elements—difficulty and competent causation—are the two essential features of achievements, and are also sources of value for all achievements. The best account to capture their value is a perfectionist theory, according to which the exercise of our characteristically human capacities has intrinsic value. But not just any perfectionist account will do. Perfectionism must acknowledge that the will is among the characteristic capacities. This book investigates the nature and value of achievements, and proposes a new strand of perfectionism to account for their value.
Jonathan Knowles and Thomas Raleigh (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- December 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803461
- eISBN:
- 9780191841644
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion ...
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Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.Less
Bertrand Russell famously distinguished between ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’ and ‘Knowledge by Description’. For much of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, many philosophers viewed the notion of acquaintance with suspicion, associating it with Russellian ideas that they would wish to reject. However in the past decade or two the concept has undergone a striking revival in mainstream ‘analytic’ philosophy – acquaintance is, it seems, respectable again. This is the first collection of new essays devoted to the topic of acquaintance, featuring contributions from many of the world’s leading experts in this area. The volume showcases the great variety of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language for which philosophers are currently employing the notion of acquaintance. This book features an extensive introduction by one of the editors, which provides some historical background as well as summarising the main debates and issues in contemporary philosophy where appeals to acquaintance are currently being made. The remaining thirteen essays are grouped thematically into the following four sections: (1) Phenomenal Consciousness, (2) Perceptual Experience, (3) Reference, (4) Epistemology.
Daniel Steel
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195331448
- eISBN:
- 9780199868063
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331448.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to ...
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The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to humans or from a pilot study to a broader population. Inferences like these are known as extrapolations. How and when extrapolation can be legitimate is a fundamental question for the biological and social sciences that has not received the attention it deserves. This book argues that previous accounts of extrapolation are inadequate and proposes a better approach that is able to answer methodological critiques of extrapolation from animal models to humans.Less
The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to humans or from a pilot study to a broader population. Inferences like these are known as extrapolations. How and when extrapolation can be legitimate is a fundamental question for the biological and social sciences that has not received the attention it deserves. This book argues that previous accounts of extrapolation are inadequate and proposes a better approach that is able to answer methodological critiques of extrapolation from animal models to humans.
Jonathan Bennett
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198237914
- eISBN:
- 9780191597077
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019823791X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The distinction between the consequences of an act and the act itself is supposed to define the fight between consequentialism and deontological moralities. This book, though sympathetic to ...
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The distinction between the consequences of an act and the act itself is supposed to define the fight between consequentialism and deontological moralities. This book, though sympathetic to consequentialism, aims less at taking sides in that debate than at clarifying the terms in which it is conducted. It aims to help the reader to think more clearly about some aspects of human conduct—especially the workings of the ‘by’‐locution, and some distinctions between making and allowing, between act and upshot, and between foreseeing and intending (the doctrine of double effect). It argues that moral philosophy would go better if the concept of ‘the act itself’ were dropped from its repertoire.Less
The distinction between the consequences of an act and the act itself is supposed to define the fight between consequentialism and deontological moralities. This book, though sympathetic to consequentialism, aims less at taking sides in that debate than at clarifying the terms in which it is conducted. It aims to help the reader to think more clearly about some aspects of human conduct—especially the workings of the ‘by’‐locution, and some distinctions between making and allowing, between act and upshot, and between foreseeing and intending (the doctrine of double effect). It argues that moral philosophy would go better if the concept of ‘the act itself’ were dropped from its repertoire.
Nicholas Wolterstorff
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805380
- eISBN:
- 9780191843457
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805380.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Participation in religious liturgies and rituals is a pervasive and remarkably complex form of human activity; this book opens with a discussion of the nature of liturgical activity and then explores ...
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Participation in religious liturgies and rituals is a pervasive and remarkably complex form of human activity; this book opens with a discussion of the nature of liturgical activity and then explores various dimensions of such activity. Over the past four or five decades there has been a remarkable surge of interest, within the analytic tradition of philosophy, in philosophy of religion. Most of what has been written by participants in this movement deals with one or another aspect of religious belief. Yet for most adherents of most religions, participation in the liturgies and rituals of their religion is at least as important as what they believe. One of the aims of this book is to call the attention of philosophers of religion to the importance of religious practice and to demonstrate how rich a topic this is for philosophical reflection. Insofar as philosophers have written about liturgy, they have focused almost exclusively on its formative and expressive functions. This book focuses instead on what liturgical agents do. What they do is basic; it is what they do that functions formatively or expressively.Less
Participation in religious liturgies and rituals is a pervasive and remarkably complex form of human activity; this book opens with a discussion of the nature of liturgical activity and then explores various dimensions of such activity. Over the past four or five decades there has been a remarkable surge of interest, within the analytic tradition of philosophy, in philosophy of religion. Most of what has been written by participants in this movement deals with one or another aspect of religious belief. Yet for most adherents of most religions, participation in the liturgies and rituals of their religion is at least as important as what they believe. One of the aims of this book is to call the attention of philosophers of religion to the importance of religious practice and to demonstrate how rich a topic this is for philosophical reflection. Insofar as philosophers have written about liturgy, they have focused almost exclusively on its formative and expressive functions. This book focuses instead on what liturgical agents do. What they do is basic; it is what they do that functions formatively or expressively.
Shaun Gallagher
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198846345
- eISBN:
- 9780191881503
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Action and Interaction is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the nature of action, starting with questions about action individuation, context, the notion of ?basic action? and the ...
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Action and Interaction is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the nature of action, starting with questions about action individuation, context, the notion of ?basic action? and the temporal structure of action. The importance of circumstance for understanding action is stressed. These topics lead to questions about intention and the sense of agency and ultimately to the idea that we need to consider action in the social contexts of interaction. The second part looks at the role of interaction in discussions of social cognition, building a contrast between standard theory- of-mind approaches and embodied/enactive accounts. Gallagher defends an enactive-interactionist account drawing on evidence from both phenomenology and empirical studies of development, ecological psychology, and studies of communicative and narrative practices, especially in more complex social practices. The third part transitions from considerations that focus on social-cognitive issues to understanding their implications for concepts that are basic to the development of a critical theory that addresses social and political issues, especially with respect to basic concepts of autonomy, recognition and justice, and the effects of norms and social institutions on our actions and interactionsLess
Action and Interaction is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the nature of action, starting with questions about action individuation, context, the notion of ?basic action? and the temporal structure of action. The importance of circumstance for understanding action is stressed. These topics lead to questions about intention and the sense of agency and ultimately to the idea that we need to consider action in the social contexts of interaction. The second part looks at the role of interaction in discussions of social cognition, building a contrast between standard theory- of-mind approaches and embodied/enactive accounts. Gallagher defends an enactive-interactionist account drawing on evidence from both phenomenology and empirical studies of development, ecological psychology, and studies of communicative and narrative practices, especially in more complex social practices. The third part transitions from considerations that focus on social-cognitive issues to understanding their implications for concepts that are basic to the development of a critical theory that addresses social and political issues, especially with respect to basic concepts of autonomy, recognition and justice, and the effects of norms and social institutions on our actions and interactions
David-Hillel Ruben
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ...
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This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.Less
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.
John Hyman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198735779
- eISBN:
- 9780191799754
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions—psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical—which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Examining them separately yields ...
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Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions—psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical—which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Examining them separately yields several significant results. First, the mark of human agency in general, like that of every kind of agent with functionally differentiated parts, is functional integration, not intention. Second, voluntariness is an ethical concept, unlike either intention or agency as such, and it is defined in negative not positive causal terms: an act is voluntary if it is not due to ignorance or compulsion, the connection between these factors being that both are normally exculpations. Third, acting intentionally cannot be defined as acting for a reason because intentional action is a manifestation of desire whereas action done for reasons is a manifestation of knowledge or belief. Furthermore, explanations that simply give agents’ reasons, e.g. ‘He took the left fork because it was the road to Larissa’, differ significantly from ones that refer to belief, e.g. ‘He took the left fork because he believed it was the road to Larissa’. For the first explanation mentions a fact about the traveller’s situation he knew and took into consideration, whereas the second merely mentions his state of mind. Drawing this distinction between these different kinds of explanations leads to a new theory of knowledge as an ability that is exercised in rational thought and behaviour, and thereby a new solution to the puzzle in the Meno about whether knowledge is a better guide to action than true belief.Less
Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions—psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical—which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Examining them separately yields several significant results. First, the mark of human agency in general, like that of every kind of agent with functionally differentiated parts, is functional integration, not intention. Second, voluntariness is an ethical concept, unlike either intention or agency as such, and it is defined in negative not positive causal terms: an act is voluntary if it is not due to ignorance or compulsion, the connection between these factors being that both are normally exculpations. Third, acting intentionally cannot be defined as acting for a reason because intentional action is a manifestation of desire whereas action done for reasons is a manifestation of knowledge or belief. Furthermore, explanations that simply give agents’ reasons, e.g. ‘He took the left fork because it was the road to Larissa’, differ significantly from ones that refer to belief, e.g. ‘He took the left fork because he believed it was the road to Larissa’. For the first explanation mentions a fact about the traveller’s situation he knew and took into consideration, whereas the second merely mentions his state of mind. Drawing this distinction between these different kinds of explanations leads to a new theory of knowledge as an ability that is exercised in rational thought and behaviour, and thereby a new solution to the puzzle in the Meno about whether knowledge is a better guide to action than true belief.
Mark Sinclair (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198786436
- eISBN:
- 9780191828751
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198786436.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This volume offers a selection of essays by leading specialists on modality and the metaphysics of modality in the history of modern philosophy, from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It ...
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This volume offers a selection of essays by leading specialists on modality and the metaphysics of modality in the history of modern philosophy, from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It revisits key moments in the history of modern modal doctrines, and illuminates lesser-known moments of that history. With this historical approach, the book aims to contextualize and even to offer alternatives to dominant positions within the contemporary philosophy of modality. Hence the volume contains not only new scholarship on the early-modern doctrines of Baruch Spinoza, G. W. Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Immanuel Kant, but also work relating to less familiar nineteenth-century thinkers such as Alexius Meinong and Jan Łukasiewicz, together with essays on celebrated nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and Bertrand Russell, whose modal doctrines have not previously garnered the attention they deserve. The volume thus covers a variety of traditions, and its historical range extends to the end of the twentieth century, since it addresses the legacy of Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of modality within recent analytic philosophy.Less
This volume offers a selection of essays by leading specialists on modality and the metaphysics of modality in the history of modern philosophy, from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It revisits key moments in the history of modern modal doctrines, and illuminates lesser-known moments of that history. With this historical approach, the book aims to contextualize and even to offer alternatives to dominant positions within the contemporary philosophy of modality. Hence the volume contains not only new scholarship on the early-modern doctrines of Baruch Spinoza, G. W. Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and Immanuel Kant, but also work relating to less familiar nineteenth-century thinkers such as Alexius Meinong and Jan Łukasiewicz, together with essays on celebrated nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Martin Heidegger, and Bertrand Russell, whose modal doctrines have not previously garnered the attention they deserve. The volume thus covers a variety of traditions, and its historical range extends to the end of the twentieth century, since it addresses the legacy of Willard Van Orman Quine’s critique of modality within recent analytic philosophy.