Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Papers Volume I$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Lewis

Print publication date: 1983

Print ISBN-13: 9780195032048

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2021

Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

(p.133) Ten Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Philosophical Papers Volume I

David Lewis

Oxford University Press

In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.

Keywords:   centered possible worlds, de dicto, de re, de se, decision theory, haecceitism, indexical, David Kaplan, John Perry, propositional attitudes, Quine, Stalnaker

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .