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Philosophical Papers Volume I$
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David Lewis

Print publication date: 1983

Print ISBN-13: 9780195032048

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001

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An Argument for the Identity Theory

An Argument for the Identity Theory

Chapter:
(p.99) Seven An Argument for the Identity Theory
Source:
Philosophical Papers Volume I
Author(s):

David Lewis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195032047.003.0007

Lewis offers a functionalist argument for the type‐type psychophysical identity theory, according to which, as a matter of fact, mental experiences are type‐identical with certain neuro‐chemical brain states. Lewis summarizes his argument as follows: “The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experience, they must be the experiences.”

Keywords:   body, epiphenomenalism, experience, functionalism, identity theory, materialism, mind, mind‐body identity, psychophysical identity

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