Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Papers Volume I$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Lewis

Print publication date: 1983

Print ISBN-13: 9780195032048

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195032047.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 October 2021

Mad Pain and Martian Pain

Mad Pain and Martian Pain

Chapter:
(p.122) Nine Mad Pain and Martian Pain
Source:
Philosophical Papers Volume I
Author(s):

David Lewis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195032047.003.0009

Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist theory of the mind. The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects; the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's ‘knowledge argument’.

Keywords:   Armstrong, functionalism, Frank Jackson, materialism, pain, phenomenal, qualia, type‐identity

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .