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The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others$
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Joel Feinberg

Print publication date: 1987

Print ISBN-13: 9780195046649

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195046641.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 17 May 2022

Harming as Wronging

Harming as Wronging

Chapter:
(p.105) 3 Harming as Wronging
Source:
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others
Author(s):

Joel Feinberg

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195046641.003.0004

Considers features of harmful acts arising from their character as violations of others’ rights. A person violates another's rights when she acts in a manner that is defective and morally indefensible, given both the risks it generates for the other person and the setbacks it causes to that person's interests either intentionally or negligently. Harming that meets these conditions is morally indefensible, as it lacks an adequate justification or excuse. The consent of the person harmed provides some justification for harming, according to the classical Volenti maxim that “to one who has consented, no wrong is done.” Feinberg goes on to examine the concept of a victim, which he defines as one who suffers any kind of unconsented‐to harm to one's interests. Feinberg concludes by considering the causation of harming.

Keywords:   causation, consent, justification, morally indefensible, rights, victim, violations, Volenti maxim

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