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Plato's Ethics$
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Terence Irwin

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780195086454

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195086457.001.0001

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Republic II: Objections to Justice

Republic II: Objections to Justice

(p.181) 12 Republic II: Objections to Justice
Plato's Ethics

Terence Irwin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

In this chapter, Plato’s view of justice is presented, which possibly differs from Socrates’. Plato’s “sufficient thesis” (virtue is sufficient for happiness), is compared with the “comparative thesis” (virtue is always better then non-virtue), held by Glaucon and Adeimantus. A detailed discussion of all the relevant problems of book II, the relation between happiness and justice, is outlined. In conclusion, some aspects of Plato’s view are critically evaluated.

Keywords:   Adeimantus, Comparative thesis, Glaucon, Happiness, Justice, Republic, Plato, Virtue, Sufficient thesis

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