Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Kantian Consequentialism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Cummiskey

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780195094534

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195094530.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

(p.161) Appendix: Kantian Internalism

(p.161) Appendix: Kantian Internalism

Kantian Consequentialism

David Cummiskey

Oxford University Press

Kant maintained that morality is a system of categorical imperatives. Categorical imperatives are supposed to have some for of rational necessity. Through a critical discussion of Williams's account of internal and external reasons and Korsgaard's account of Kantian practical reason, we see that Kant defended a plausible combination of strong reason internalism and weak motive internalism. An internalist approach to morality must begin with the perspective of the deliberating moral agent. In this very important sense, moral principles are necessarily agent‐centered. Consequentialism, however, can be fully agent‐centered in the requisite sense. The requirement to promote the good of all can be an agent‐centered requirement and even an agent‐centered constraint of the maximization of one's own good. Kantian internalism is fully compatible with a consequentialist categorical imperative.

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .