Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Kantian Consequentialism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Cummiskey

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780195094534

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195094530.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

Formal Principles and Objective Ends

Formal Principles and Objective Ends

(p.46) 3 Formal Principles and Objective Ends
Kantian Consequentialism

David Cummiskey (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Kant argued at length against the idea that moral principles could be “material” principles, but consequentialist principles presuppose a theory of the good and thus seem to be material principles. After a careful explication of Kant's distinction between formal principles and material principles, especially as it is developed in The Critique of Practical Reason, we see that a consequentialist principle can indeed be a formal principle, and that they can even pass the universalizability test for moral principles. The formula of universal law is compatible with consequentialism.

Keywords:   consequentialism, formal principle, material principle, principles, the good, universal law, universalizability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .