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Mobilizing for PeaceConflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine$
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Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195125924

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195125924.001.0001

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The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998

The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998

(p.94) 5 The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998
Mobilizing for Peace

Tamar Hermann

Oxford University Press

In the late 1960s, and especially after the 1973 war, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) concerned to resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict, peacefully began to emerge in Israel, and in the 1980s, P/CROs became an integral, although mainly unpopular part of Israeli political life. P/CROs’ activities included consciousness raising and protest, dialog promotion, some professional service provision, and the articulation of propeace arguments. Discord amongst P/CROs over the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the conservative turn taken by the Israeli government and society after Rabin's assassination, left Israeli P/CROs weak and ineffectual by the mid 1990s. Furthermore, they had always been hamstrung by the public's perception of the P/CRO political agenda as naïve and idealistic, by their extraparliamentary status in a country that prioritized parliamentary politics, and by their homogeneous membership – older, middle class, highly educated, urban, secular Ashkenazi Jews, many of them born in the USA. While the Israeli government ultimately took advantage of the propeace attitude fostered by the P/CROs and adopted much of the program advocated by P/CROs, it consistently denied them any credit for or role in the peace process.

Keywords:   extraparliamentary status, homogeneous membership, Israel, Oslo Accords, P/CRO activities, P/CRO political agenda, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs), Rabin's assassination

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