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The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130058

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

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Virtues in Epistemology

Virtues in Epistemology

(p.287) Chapter 9 Virtues in Epistemology
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

John Greco

Oxford University Press

In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable cognitive abilities or powers,” can be illuminating in an account of knowledge. He sets out to support this on the grounds that his approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems on the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.

Keywords:   Gettier problem, John Greco, Humean skepticism, intellectual virtue, moral, reliabilism, Ernest Sosa, true belief

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