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The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology$
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Paul K. Moser

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195130058

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195130057.001.0001

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Epistemology and Ethics

Epistemology and Ethics

(p.479) Chapter 17 Epistemology and Ethics
The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

Noah Lemos

Oxford University Press

In ”Epistemology and Ethics,” Noah Lemos suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how we can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. After addressing skeptical arguments, he considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of moral knowledge. Lemos favors a particularist approach whereby we begin with instances of moral knowledge and use these to formulate and evaluate criteria for moral knowledge. After relating his approach to concerns about the nature of the epistemic justification of moral beliefs as dealt with by foundationalists and coherentists, Lemos responds to arguments against particularist approaches in moral epistemology. Specifically, he addresses the claim that our moral beliefs must receive their justification from an independent moral criterion developed from nonmoral beliefs.

Keywords:   coherentism, ethics, foundationalism, moral belief, moral epistemology, moral knowledge, Noah Lemos, particularism

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