Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Warranted Christian Belief$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alvin Plantinga

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780195131932

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195131932.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 12 May 2021



(p.3) 1 Kant
Warranted Christian Belief

Alvin Plantinga (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

My interest in Warranted Christian Belief is in this question: Is it rational, or reasonable, or justified, or warranted to accept Christian belief? But there is a prior question: Is the very idea of Christian belief coherent? Many theologians and others believe that there is real difficulty with the idea that our concepts could apply to such a being as the Christian God (infinite and transcendent as he is supposed to be), and that this constitutes a serious problem for Christian belief: Christian belief involves the belief that it is possible to think of, refer to, and predicate properties of God, but in fact none of these things are possible, because human concepts cannot apply to God (so goes the argument). In this chapter and the next, I examine this objection to Christian belief, turning in this chapter to the thought of Immanuel Kant. Against the opinions of some, I argue that there is no good reason provided by Kant (or constructible from materials found in Kant) for the conclusion that our concepts do not apply to God.

Keywords:   Christian belief, concepts, God, Kant, properties, transcendence

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .