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The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory$
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David Copp

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195147797

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195147790.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 October 2020

Deontology

Deontology

Chapter:
(p.424) Chapter 15 DEONTOLOGY
Source:
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
Author(s):

David McNaughton (Contributor Webpage)

Piers Rawling (Contributor Webpage)

, David Copp
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195147790.003.0016

This chapter proposes a novel form of deontology that, while it contrasts with consequentialism in defending duties of special relationship and options, is allied with consequentialism in denying that there are moral constraints. It devotes considerable attention to distinguishing between various consequentialist doctrines, and the distinction between them and deontology. The distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality plays a crucial role here. It also discusses and rejects contractualism. The same applies to particularism in its most radical form: despite the sympathy for the particularist’s skepticism concerning strict moral principles, it is argued that there are principles of a weaker, Rossian form.

Keywords:   agent-neutrality, agent-relativity, consequentialism, contractualism, deontology, moral constraints, moral principle, option, particularism, special relationship

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