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Kant's Theory of KnowledgeAn Analytical Introduction$
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Georges Dicker

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195153064

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195153065.001.0001

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The Central Argument of the Analytic (I)

The Central Argument of the Analytic (I)

The Transcendental Deduction

Chapter:
(p.84) 4 The Central Argument of the Analytic (I)
Source:
Kant's Theory of Knowledge
Author(s):

Georges Dicker (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195153065.003.0004

This chapter introduces the Transcendental Deduction as an attempt to refute the Humean view of experience by validating the categories of substance and cause. It reconstructs the first edition version of the Deduction, drawing on the work of Robert Paul Wolff. It offers two versions of this argument, treating the second version as a prolongation of the first version. It defends the argument against objections, but also shows the need for the further prolongation of the argument that takes place in the Analogies of Experience.

Keywords:   possibility of experience, Humean view of experience, unity of consciousness, Patchwork theory of the Deduction, manifold of representations, representations’ reference to an object, synthesis, temporality thesis, First Version of the Deduction, Second Version of the Deduction

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