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Persons and CausesThe Metaphysics of Free Will$
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Timothy O'Connor

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195153743

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019515374X.001.0001

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Freedom and Determinism

Freedom and Determinism

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 Freedom and Determinism
Source:
Persons and Causes
Author(s):

Timothy O'Connor (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515374X.003.0001

The author considers the modal, or ”consequence,” argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. He diagnoses the defects in van Inwagen's original formulation of the Beta principle before recasting and defending a variant of the argument in terms of two simpler closure principles governing unavoidability. After disputing Frankfurt's case against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, he argues that even if one rejects an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility, it would be implausible to conclude that responsibility is consistent with determinism.

Keywords:   ability, Beta principle, compatibilism, determinism, Frankfurt, free will, incompatibilism, Van Inwagen, moral responsibility, Principle of Alternative Possibilities

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