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Motivation and Agency$
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Alfred R. Mele

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195156171

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001

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Goal‐Directed Action

Goal‐Directed Action

Chapter:
(p.38) 2 Goal‐Directed Action
Source:
Motivation and Agency
Author(s):

Alfred R. Mele (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515617X.003.0003

Argues for a constraint on a proper theory of motivation – namely, that proper motivational explanations of goal‐directed actions are causal explanations. The chapter criticizes the thesis that acceptable teleological explanations of actions are not causal explanations and it offers a solution to a problem that deviant causal chains pose for a causal theory of action.

Keywords:   action, causal explanation, causal theory of action, deviant causal chain, motivation, motivational explanation, teleological explanation

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