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Motivation and Agency$
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Alfred R. Mele

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195156171

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001

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Motivational Strength

Motivational Strength

(p.161) 7 Motivational Strength
Motivation and Agency

Alfred R. Mele (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.

Keywords:   action, affect, desires, human agency, intentional action, motivational strength, practical reasoning

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