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Socrates, Pleasure, and Value$
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George Rudebusch

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159615

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001

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Callicles Refuted

Callicles Refuted

(p.53) Five Callicles Refuted
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

George Rudebusch (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It is of the highest importance to Plato to refute Callicles’ hedonist thesis, and for the purposes of such a refutation, he gives two arguments, which I call the argument from opposites (495e–497d) and the argument from pleased cowards (497d–499a). I give a new interpretation of these arguments and show that both arguments are defensible.

Keywords:   Callicles, hedonism, human good, immoralism, Plato, pleasure, Socrates

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