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Socrates, Pleasure, and Value$
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George Rudebusch

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159615

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001

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Does Socrates Consistently Hold the Sufficiency Thesis?

Does Socrates Consistently Hold the Sufficiency Thesis?

(p.115) Nine Does Socrates Consistently Hold the Sufficiency Thesis?
Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

George Rudebusch (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Although Socrates gives a compelling argument in Republic book 1 that virtue is sufficient for happiness, in other passages he seems to hold that it is insufficient. Brickhouse and Smith resolve the apparent inconsistency by attributing an insufficiency thesis to Socrates. I argue, against their interpretation, that Socrates can consistently hold the sufficiency thesis.

Keywords:   happiness, Plato, Socrates, virtue

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