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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

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Substance and Cause

Substance and Cause

Chapter:
(p.185) 10 Substance and Cause
Source:
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Author(s):

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515987X.003.0010

The chief difficulty for agent-causal accounts lies in defending the notion of agent causation. Either of two types of realist account of causation can be drawn on to explicate the claim that enduring substances are among the causes of things. But there remains the objection that, although this claim is intelligible, it is necessarily false. Several objections to the possibility of substance causation are considered, and it is concluded that there are, on balance, good reasons to reject this possibility.

Keywords:   agent-causal libertarian accounts, agent causation, causation, realist accounts of causation, substance, substance causation

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