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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

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Event‐Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation

Event‐Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation

(p.29) 3 Event‐Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins an examination of event-causal libertarian accounts, which require nondeterministic event causation. This type of view offers satisfactory causal accounts of acting for reasons and reason-explanation. On two plausible accounts of contrastive explanation, even contrastive rational explanations are available for some nondeterministically caused actions. Libertarian views of Robert Kane and Robert Nozick are examined.

Keywords:   acting for reasons, action, causal explanation, contrastive explanation, event-causal libertarian accounts, explanation, Robert Kane, nondeterministic causation, Robert Nozick, reason-explanation

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