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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

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Agent Causation and Control

Agent Causation and Control

(p.151) 9 Agent Causation and Control
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that free will requires downward causation—of a sort involving the supersession of microlevel laws—is rejected.

Keywords:   agent-causal libertarian accounts, agent causation, control, downward causation, free action, free will, origination, Galen Strawson, Peter van Inwagen

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