Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195162295

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195162293.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 21 May 2022

Strategic Reliabilism: Epistemic Significance

Strategic Reliabilism: Epistemic Significance

Chapter:
(p.93) Strategic Reliabilism: Epistemic Significance
Source:
Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
Author(s):

Michael A Bishop (Contributor Webpage)

J. D. Trout (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195162293.003.0007

This chapter offers a framework for understanding significance that tolerates our incomplete knowledge of the conditions for human well-being. Topics discussed include the role of significance in Strategic Reliabilism, a reason-based approach to significance, and the potential unavailability of objective reasons. It is argued that a proper understanding of the notion of epistemic significance is a core problem for any epistemological theory that claims to be able to guide reason, and that any epistemological view that gives a central place to the notion of significance is bound to be deeply empirical.

Keywords:   epistemology, human reasoning, well-being, reason-based approach

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .