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Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment$
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Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195162295

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195162293.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 January 2022

The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology

The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology

Chapter:
(p.104) The Troubles with Standard Analytic Epistemology
Source:
Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
Author(s):

Michael A Bishop (Contributor Webpage)

J. D. Trout (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195162293.003.0008

This chapter compares the authors' naturalistic approach to epistemology to that of SAE. It is argued that the theories of SAE are structurally analogous to the naturalistic approach — they have at their core a descriptive theory, and from that descriptive theory, proponents of SAE draw normative, epistemological prescriptions. The prospects for the theories of SAE overcoming the is-ought gap are not good. The chapter also argues for the superiority of Strategic Reliabilism over any extant theory of Standard Analytic Epistemology.

Keywords:   naturalistic approach, descriptive theory, SAE, is-ought gap, Strategic Reliabilism

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