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Sentimental RulesOn the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement$
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Shaun Nichols

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195169348

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195169344.001.0001

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Sentiment, Reason, and Motivation

Sentiment, Reason, and Motivation

(p.97) 5 Sentiment, Reason, and Motivation
Sentimental Rules

Shaun Nichols

Oxford University Press

An adequate sentimentalist account must explain (i) how emotion plays a role in linking moral judgment to motivation, (ii) how moral judgments can be made in the absence of emotional response, and (iii) how reason can play an important role in moral judgment. This chapter argues that the account of moral judgment sketched in chapter 1 can accommodate all these features of moral judgment, and the account suggests a new distinction in debates over the relation between moral judgment and motivation. However, the chapter also acknowledges an important shortcoming in the account of moral judgment presented in the volume, namely, the account makes the relationship between emotions and norms seem surprisingly contingent.

Keywords:   etiquette, internalism, moral motivation, moral reasoning

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