Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Early Modern PhilosophyMind, Matter, and Metaphysics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christia Mercer and Eileen O'Neill

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195177602

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195177606.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 November 2020

The Strange Hybridity of Spinoza's Ethics

The Strange Hybridity of Spinoza's Ethics

(p.86) The Strange Hybridity of Spinoza's Ethics
Early Modern Philosophy

Catherine Wilson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter shows how Spinoza's severe ontology is at odds with his commitment to the general ethical program. It then tries to explain why, as a recent commentator expresses it, “Spinoza's ethical theory has been historically less influential than the ethical theories of such early modern philosophers as Hume and Kant”. However, the same commentator suggests that “in its naturalism, its practical rationalism, its asymmetrical conception of moral freedom and responsibility, its nonretributivism, its emphasis on virtue as well as consequences, and its close relations to social and political theory, it is a forerunner of and of special relevance to contemporary trends in ethical theorizing”. It is argued that the vector of contemporary moral theory is irreversibly pointed away from Spinozism and shares few assumptions with it.

Keywords:   ethical theory, moral freedom, responsibility, contemporary moral theory, Spinoza

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .