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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Are Any Moral Beliefs True?

Are Any Moral Beliefs True?

(p.32) 3 Are Any Moral Beliefs True?
Moral Skepticisms

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores moral nihilism and error theories, which hold that moral beliefs are truth-apt but never true. Arguments for such views from relativity, evolution, and epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical queerness are all explained and critically assessed. The logical and semantic coherence of moral nihilism is then defended. The result is that moral nihilism is far from proven, but remains a serious contender in moral epistemology.

Keywords:   error theories, moral nihilism, moral relativity, moral relativism, evolution, queerness, coherence, moral realism, expressivism, constructivism

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