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Moral Skepticisms$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195187724

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001

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Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?

Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?

(p.60) 4 Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?
Moral Skepticisms

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter distinguishes different ways for moral beliefs and believers to be justified: instrumentally or epistemically, permissively or positively, slightly or adequately, and personally or impersonally. It explains the two main arguments against justified moral belief: the skeptical regress argument and the skeptical hypothesis or scenario argument. It concludes that these arguments pose a dilemma because their flaws are hard to detect, and their conclusions are hard to believe.

Keywords:   justified belief, knowledge, Gettier problems, skeptical regress, skeptical hypothesis, skeptical scenario, closure

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