Libertarianism, Luck, and Control
Libertarianism, Luck, and Control
This chapter critically examines recent work on free will and moral responsibility by Randolph Clarke, Robert Kane, and Timothy O’Connor, in an attempt to clarify issues about control and luck that are central to the debate between libertarians (agent causationists and others) and their critics. It is argued that present luck, that is, luck at the time of action, poses an as yet unresolved problem for libertarianism.
Keywords: agent causation, Randolph Clarke, control, Robert Kane, libertarianism, moral responsibility, Timothy O’Connor
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