Objections and Replies
Objections and Replies
This chapter responds to the following objections against pluralistic relativism: it is unable to explain moral disagreement; it undermines confidence in one’s moral commitments; it makes learning from other cultures impossible; the notion of “local” criteria of adequacy for moralities cannot be regarded as criteria at all; it is not a form of relativism but rather a form of pluralism simpliciter; there is nothing like the fixed human nature presupposed in the argument for it; the functional conception of morality is biased toward consequentialist moralities.
Keywords: confidence, consequentialist, human nature, other cultures, local criteria, moral disagreement, pluralism
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