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Natural MoralitiesA Defense of Pluralistic Relativism$
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David B. Wong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195305395

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195305396.001.0001

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 Objections and Replies

 Objections and Replies

(p.76) 3 Objections and Replies
Natural Moralities

David B. Wong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter responds to the following objections against pluralistic relativism: it is unable to explain moral disagreement; it undermines confidence in one’s moral commitments; it makes learning from other cultures impossible; the notion of “local” criteria of adequacy for moralities cannot be regarded as criteria at all; it is not a form of relativism but rather a form of pluralism simpliciter; there is nothing like the fixed human nature presupposed in the argument for it; the functional conception of morality is biased toward consequentialist moralities.

Keywords:   confidence, consequentialist, human nature, other cultures, local criteria, moral disagreement, pluralism

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