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Natural MoralitiesA Defense of Pluralistic Relativism$
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David B. Wong

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780195305395

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195305396.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 November 2020

 Does Psychological Realism Constrain the Content of Moralities? *

 Does Psychological Realism Constrain the Content of Moralities? *

(p.159) 6 Does Psychological Realism Constrain the Content of Moralities?*
Natural Moralities

David B. Wong (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses a possible constraint on moralities based on psychological realism, and in particular what is realistic to expect in the way of adherence to impersonal values when most human beings strongly favor personal values such as special relationships and personal projects and commitments. A focus of the discussion is a possible constraint on the achievement of strong forms of equality. It is argued that such a constraint seems most plausible when one focuses on the strength of acquisitive and competitive motives as they appear in places such as the United States, but the existence of cultural variability in what is viewed as acceptable inequalities weighs against taking the strength of such motives for granted. A stronger case can be made for the conclusion that commitments to impersonal values are best mediated through personal values such as commitments to community.

Keywords:   acquisitive, community, competitive, equality, impersonal values, personal values, psychological realism

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