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MindreadingAn Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds$
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Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236108

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0198236107.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

A Cognitive Theory of Pretence

A Cognitive Theory of Pretence

Chapter:
(p.16) 2 A Cognitive Theory of Pretence
Source:
Mindreading
Author(s):

Shaun Nichols

Stephen P. Stich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198236107.003.0002

One central theme of the book is that the capacity for mindreading implicates the capacity for pretense and imagination. In order to explain the processes underlying mindreading, it is vital to develop an account of the cognitive architecture subserving pretense and imagination. This chapter develops such an account and compares it to rival metarepresentational and simulation-theory accounts. On the account that is defended, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs, and are processed by the same inference mechanisms that operate over beliefs.

Keywords:   metarepresentation, pretense, imaginary desires, imagination, possible world, simulation, Robert Gordon, Alan Leslie

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