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Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. Part 2 argues that these mental events consist in the instantiations of properties in immaterial substances, souls. A human being (and any higher animal) consists of two parts, the essential part – his soul, and a contingent part – his body. It is extremely unlikely that there could be a scientific explanation of the creation of souls. Humans a ... More
Keywords: afterlife, animals, dualism, free will, human being, materialism, mental events, metaphysics, moral awareness, personal identity, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, reason, soul, Richard Swinburne
Print publication date: 1997 | Print ISBN-13: 9780198236986 |
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 | DOI:10.1093/0198236980.001.0001 |
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