The Evolution of the Soul
Richard Swinburne
Abstract
Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. Part 2 argues that these mental events consist in the instantiations of properties in immaterial substances, souls. A human being (and any higher animal) consists of two parts, the essential part – his soul, and a contingent part – his body. It is extremely unlikely that there could be a scientific explanation of the creation of souls. Humans a ... More
Part 1 (Chs. 2–7) argues that mental events (consisting in the instantiation of mental properties – sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs) are distinct from physical events (such as brain events), although in causal interaction with them. Part 2 argues that these mental events consist in the instantiations of properties in immaterial substances, souls. A human being (and any higher animal) consists of two parts, the essential part – his soul, and a contingent part – his body. It is extremely unlikely that there could be a scientific explanation of the creation of souls. Humans are distinguished from the higher animals by an ability to reason logically, and by having moral awareness, free will, and an integrated system of beliefs and desires. Neither direct empirical evidence nor pure a priori philosophical argument can show what will happen to the soul after death. This could only be shown by some very general metaphysical system.
Keywords:
afterlife,
animals,
dualism,
free will,
human being,
materialism,
mental events,
metaphysics,
moral awareness,
personal identity,
philosophy of mind,
philosophy of religion,
reason,
soul,
Richard Swinburne
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 1997 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780198236986 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 |
DOI:10.1093/0198236980.001.0001 |
