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The Act Itself$
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Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237914

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019823791X.001.0001

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Other Attempts

Other Attempts

(p.121) 8 Other Attempts
The Act Itself

Jonathan Bennett

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses attempts by Dinello, Kamm, Kagan, Bentham, Warren Quinn, and others to explain the making/allowing distinction. In each case, it is shown that if the proposed account can be tightened up into something significant and defensible, that always turns it into something equivalent to the analysis of Bennett (Ch. 6) or, more often, that of Donagan (Ch. 7). It is argued that on either of the latter analyses, making/allowing certainly has no basic moral significance, though it may often be accompanied by factors that do have such significance.

Keywords:   allowing, Bentham, Dinello, Donagan, KaganKamm, making, Quinn

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