From a veritistic standpoint, true belief is better than either ignorance or error, and higher degrees of belief in truths are better than lower degrees of belief, at least on topics of interest. These sorts of states have “fundamental” veritistic value (in varying degrees), and practices that produce changes in veritistically valuable states have “instrumental” veritistic value (V‐value). Veritistic social epistemology evaluates actual and possible social practices in terms of instrumental V‐value. This conception is preferable to rivals such as consensus consequentialism, utility consequentialism, and pure proceduralism. The feasibility of veritistic analysis is defended, worries about circularity are allayed, and various technical details are explored.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.