This chapter begins the detailed analysis of specific Kantian doctrines of the mind by pointing out that, despite its sharp critique of many rationalist arguments, Kant's Critical philosophy remains committed to the core rationalist claim that the mind ultimately cannot be material. This claim follows from transcendental idealism's general doctrine that nothing is material in itself. I explain in detail how this view is compatible with Kant's critical observations, in the first and second paralogisms, concerning traditional arguments for the self's substantiality and simplicity. Here, as elsewhere, it is useful to contrast Kant's views at four different levels (noumenal, phenomenal, scientific, and appearance), and to distinguish his thoughts about what is true, or even practically demonstrable, from what may be established a priori by theoretical reason.
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