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Kant's Theory of MindAn Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason$
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Karl Ameriks

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198238973

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198238975.001.0001

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(p.128) Chapter IV Identity
Kant's Theory of Mind

Karl Ameriks (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter concerns Kant's views on the issue of personal identity, the topic of the third paralogism. This is an especially complicated topic for Kant because it immediately requires bringing together non‐temporal (noumenal) and temporal (phenomenal) aspects of the self: something is one and the same ‘person’ only if in a certain way it is one and the same mental substance over time. I note the striking diversity of readings of Kant's argument here—some suggest the issue is primarily epistemological and empirical, others see that it is metaphysical. I also show how the range of recent analytic discussions of personal identity mirrors the basic options that Kant anticipated, at least implicitly.

Keywords:   empiricism, identity, person, survivalism, time

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