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Ignorance – A Case for Scepticism - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism

Peter Unger


Argues for the thesis of universal ignorance, i.e., for the claim that nobody can ever know anything. To this effect, puts forward versions of the classical Cartesian argument for skepticism as well as novel arguments involving normative premises and the concept of certainty. Universal ignorance gives rise to further skeptical results: in order to be justified or reasonable in believing something, the subject must know something to be so. Likewise, many attitudes (e.g., being happy about or regretting something) and “illocutionary acts” (e.g., commanding, apologizing) require that the subject ... More

Keywords: certainty, ignorance, illocutionary acts, justification, knowledge, language, normativity, rationality, skepticism, truth

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 1978 Print ISBN-13: 9780198244172
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI:10.1093/0198244177.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Peter Unger, author
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