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Moral ThinkingIts Levels, Method, and Point$
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R. M. Hare

Print publication date: 1981

Print ISBN-13: 9780198246602

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198246609.001.0001

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Objectivity and Rationality

Objectivity and Rationality

(p.206) 12 Objectivity and Rationality
Moral Thinking

R. M. Hare

Oxford University Press

Moral philosophers have been largely concerned with the question of whether moral judgements are objective or subjective. In most senses, moral judgements are neither objective nor subjective, and the belief that they have to be one or the other is the result of a fundamental error (e.g. descriptivism), which both objectivists and subjectivists make. The rationality of moral thought rests on there being a system of reasoning for deciding which of the principles of rationality to adopt called critical thinking. In preferring what we prefer, morality compels us to accommodate ourselves to the preference of others, and this has the effect that when we are thinking morally and doing it rationally we shall all prefer the same moral prescriptions about matters that affect other people.

Keywords:   morality, objectivity, rationality, subjectivism, subjectivity

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