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Moral ThinkingIts Levels, Method, and Point$
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R. M. Hare

Print publication date: 1981

Print ISBN-13: 9780198246602

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198246609.001.0001

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Loyalty and Evil Desires

Loyalty and Evil Desires

(p.130) 8 Loyalty and Evil Desires
Moral Thinking

R. M. Hare

Oxford University Press

Deals with objections that are commonly levelled against utilitarianism concerning its potential counterintuitive conclusions. Hare provides instructions on how to manufacture objections of this sort and then on how to demolish them. This is done because such objections, and the answer to such objections, all take the same form. It is argued that this strategy can be used to dismount the objections that utilitarianism does not allow individuals to give any weight to personal duties or loyalties, and that utilitarianism cannot provide a principled distinction between good and evil desires.

Keywords:   desires, loyalty, utilitarianism

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