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Reasons and Persons$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 1986

Print ISBN-13: 9780198249085

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019824908X.001.0001

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Personal Identity and Rationality

Personal Identity and Rationality

(p.307) 14 Personal Identity and Rationality
Reasons and Persons

Derek Parfit (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Examines whether, if a reductionist view is true, we have any reason for special concern about our own future and gives extreme and moderate answers. It offers an argument against the Classical Self‐interest Theory, defending a discount rate, not with respect to time itself, but with respect to the degree of psychological connectedness between ourselves now and ourselves at different future times. It also presents the immorality of imprudence.

Keywords:   concern, immorality, imprudence, personal identity, prudence, rationality, reason, reductionism, self‐interest

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