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Reasons and Persons$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 1986

Print ISBN-13: 9780198249085

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019824908X.001.0001

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Personal Identity and Morality

Personal Identity and Morality

(p.321) 15 Personal Identity and Morality
Reasons and Persons

Derek Parfit (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Discusses Autonomy and Paternalism; becoming and ceasing to be a person, or human being; whether reductionism about persons undermines desert. It examines personal identity and commitments; the separateness of persons and principles of distributive justice – whether we should extend the scope of these principles, and give them less weight, whether the units for distributive principles should be lives, successive selves, or people at times, and how a reductionist view gives some support to the utilitarian rejection of distributive principles.

Keywords:   abortion, commitment, compensation, desert, distributive justice, person, personal identity, reductionism, utilitarianism

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