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Reasons and Persons$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 1986

Print ISBN-13: 9780198249085

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019824908X.001.0001

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Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating

Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating

(p.87) 4 Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Reasons and Persons

Derek Parfit (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.

Keywords:   agent‐relative, prisoner's dilemma, public goods, self‐defeating

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