Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Value and ContextThe Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Alan Thomas

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250173

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 09 August 2020

A Critique of Expressivism

A Critique of Expressivism

(p.101) 5 A Critique of Expressivism
Value and Context

Alan Thomas (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the expressive/projective strategy, which covers a family of views with interrelated common themes. The two most highly developed themes, norm expressivism (defended by Allan Gibbard) and projectivism (defended by Simon Blackburn), are considered. Both focus on the crucial issue of how we should understand our desire to explain the ethical within a generally naturalistic framework. One way in which the theories discussed in this chapter differ from earlier forms of non-cognitivism is that they are intended to constitute a general theory of normativity, which, while it is supposed to bolster some of the intuitions underlying the prevalent conception of value, does not exactly match the extension of that term. The non-cognitivists discussed in this chapter operate with a descriptive/normative distinction, not a fact/value distinction.

Keywords:   expressivism, projectivism, non-cognitivist, cognitivism, normativity, value, Allan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .