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Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2$
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Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250920

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250924.001.0001

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Hume and Belief

Hume and Belief

(p.221) Chapter 33 Hume and Belief
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2

Jonathan Bennett

Oxford University Press

Locke discusses the formation of propositional thoughts, but takes for granted the difference between thinking P and believing that P. Hume does the reverse: theorizes about belief, while helping himself to propositional thoughts. He rightly holds that wondering does not differ from believing in propositional content; the only difference he can find is in how vivaciously the relevant propositional idea occurs in the person's mind. This is a bad account of belief, though there is much instructive philosophy in Hume's arguments for it.

Keywords:   belief, Hume, idea, Locke, proposition, vivacity

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