Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250920

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250924.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 September 2020

Hume and Leibniz on Personal Identity

Hume and Leibniz on Personal Identity

(p.343) Chapter 40 Hume and Leibniz on Personal Identity
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2

Jonathan Bennett

Oxford University Press

Hume's section ‘Of Personal Identity’ owes its shape to Locke's, and Hume evidently wants to capture and explain any of Locke's results that he thinks are true. Where Locke argues from conceptual intuitions about possible cases, Hume argues from high theory. He holds that all diachronic identity‐statements are, strictly speaking, false; but he has a theory about which of them will pass muster as truths in everyday life; and this, he thinks, enables him to predict which judgements of personal identity we will accept and which we will not. He recants his entire account in an appendix to the Treatise, for a cryptically expressed reason that seems to be valid. In Hume's view, there are strictly no persons, but what passes for persons in everyday life are sequences of perceptions, united in certain ways. Leibniz's main account of what a substance is is strikingly similar to that; likenesses and differences are teased out.

Keywords:   Hume, identity, Leibniz, Locke, person, personal identity, substance

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .