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Value JudgementImproving Our Ethical Beliefs$
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James Griffin

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752318

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001

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Value and Nature

Value and Nature

(p.52) IV Value and Nature
Value Judgement

James Griffin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Can value judgements be ‘correct’ or ‘true’ and, if so, in what sense? This chapter argues for the proposal in the preceding chapter that any plausible account of how we identify prudential values is more complex than is indicated by a simple reductive naturalist model, the Humean model or certain forms of intuitionist model. The chapter argues that the most plausible account will give a role to both recognition and reaction, but without the sharp separation between them or the priority to one of them that the Humean model makes central. It develops an error theory for judgements about human interests and for a kind of realism about these interests and events of their being met or not met.

Keywords:   error theory, ethical realism, ethical truth, Hume, intuitionism, naturalism, value judgement

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