Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Value JudgementImproving Our Ethical Beliefs$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

James Griffin

Print publication date: 1998

Print ISBN-13: 9780198752318

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198752318.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 October 2020



(p.85) VI Agents
Value Judgement

James Griffin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Once moral norms are of concern, action is too; once action is of concern, the nature of agents is too. This chapter investigates the limits of human motivation and of human understanding, and how, if at all, these limits constrain the content of moral norms. It decides how we should understand the principle (obviously correct on some interpretation of it) that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.

Keywords:   ethics, moral motivation, motivation, ought, understanding

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .