Kant's ethics is often but wrongly criticized for neglecting the virtues or offering a poor account of them. He in fact offers a rich and careful account, and a plausible reading of his theory of action shows that it is neither too inward nor too individualistic. In particular, maxims of virtue are ‘not objects of introspection’ (Kant denies that we have adequate self‐knowledge) and ‘not constructed by ascription’ (their relation to action is too indeterminate). Rather, Kant sees maxims of virtue as ‘prescriptions’, which can be used to guide virtuous action, but may provide no way of showing whether virtue has been achieved.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.