On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private‐Language Argumen t
On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private‐Language Argumen t
Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.
Keywords: assertion conditions, following rules, hume, meaning something by an expression, practice, private language argument, rule-scepticism, S. Kripke
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